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Appeal No. 20110788-CA
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
MIDLAND FUNDING LLC,
Plaintiff and Appellee
vs.
KENNETH PIPKIN,
Defendant and Appellant, Pro Se
On Appeal from the Fifth Judicial District Court, State of Utah,
Washington County, St George Department,
Case No. 110500860
Judge Eric A. Ludlow
BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT
Defendant/Appellant requests oral arguments.
JOHNSON MARK LLC

KENNETH

P.O. Box 7811

P. O. Box mi

Sandy, Utah 84091
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S T A T E M E N T O F T H E ISSUES
1. Did die District Court err in its decision without considering Plaintiff/Appellee
had violated Defendant /Appellant's Rights and requests for verification of
alleged debr Pursuant to FDCPA? Seepage. 5, Answer to Complaint "Defendant
requested information listed on 1SI Request for ORIGINAL Documentation
and ORIGINAL contracts from Plaintiff on Date of June 18, 2010 (Copy
attached as Exhibit "A")". See page. J.7, Memorandum in Support ofMotion in
Opposition to Motion for Sumrmiy Judgment. ".. .Pursuant to the Fair Debt
Collections Practices Act (FDCPA), there has been no documented evidence of
alleged debt provided to Defendant by Plaintiff or any affiliated parties, alleged
debt is null and void. Defendant has no access to information regarding alleged
debt". See Exhibits '14 " through *£ ".
2. Did the District Court err in its decision after Plaintiff/Appellee had neglected
to cease collection activity after Defendant/Appellant had requested name and
address of original creditor Pursuant to FDCPA? Seepage 50* Motion to Dismiss
"Defendant has repeatedly requested Evidence of alleged debt Pursuant to FairDebt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), which gives Defendant certain Rights
under FDCPA. Seepage 65. Motion for Reconsideration. 'Defendant states that, to
date as of this Motion, Plaintiff has disregarded Defendant's requests to
produce to Defendant: (1) Documented evidence of alleged debt, (2) name and
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address of original creditor and (3) name and address of current creditor(s).
Although Plaintiff neglected to produce any of requested evidence and address
information, Plaintiff failed to cease collection of alleged debt. Defendant's first
request was timely mailed to Plaintiff as required in FDCPA requirements': Seepage 113, Alotion for E^edited Post-Judgment Hearing. 'Defendant also requests the
Court to consider Plaintiffs disregard of Defendant's Rights Pursuant to
FDCPA as Defendant mailed, via Certified Mail, a request for original contract
and name and address of original creditor, as well as name and address of
current creditor". See Exhibits '14" thro?/gb ' £ "
3. Did the District Court err m holding that, Pursuant to Rule 56(c),
Plaintiff/Appellee had succeeded in "showpng] that there was no genuine issue
as to any material fact" after Defendant/Appellant raised questions regarding
Plaintiff/Appellee's allegations of "Breach of Contract", without
Plaintiff/Appellee presenting alleged contract to support said claim? Seepage 3"7f
Memorandum in Support ofMotion in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment
"Defendant does not dispute validity of age, competency or employment of
Affiant Affiant's affidavit does not provide documented evidence of alleged
debt therefore is irrelevant". See 'bams 52 and 53, Re&Iv to Plaintiffs Qbbositioii to
Motion to Dismiss. "Regarding Plaintiffs alleged "Breach of contract claim", (1)
no contract has been provided to Defendant, or the Court (to Defendant's
knowledge) as evidence of alleged debt, (2) Plaintiff has repeatedly disregarded
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR,
7 may contain errors.

Defendant's requests for evidence of alleged debt showing poor performance
by the party (Plaintiff) seeking alleged recovery, (3) no evidence of alleged debt,
namely "an original contract", has been provided to Defendant to support
Plaintiffs alleged "breach of contract by (any) p&ny", and (4) there has been no
evidence of alleged debt presented to support alleged "damages"..... Therefore,
as "not remembering" alleged debt is not evidence that alleged debt does not
exist. Plaintiff alleging that alleged debt exists, without providing or presenting
evidence of alleged debt, also is not evidence that alleged debt exists.".
4. Did the District Court err in holding that Plaintiff/Appellee had produced
sufficient evidence attached to Affidavit Pursuant to Rule 56(e) to establish a
prima facie case? Seepage 24, Affidavit qfMycah Struck, "I have access to and have
reviewed the records pertaining to...". See Exhibit "A"ofPlaintiff/,appellee's
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion tor Summary Judgment Pages 18 through
24, Seepage 126, Reply in Support of^Motion forExpeditedPost'-JudgmentHearing.
"Defendant submits the same argument because Plaintiff has failed and
continues to fail to present original contract winch Plaintiff accuses Defendant
of Breaching. In order for there to be a breach of contract, there must be a
contract in existence, winch Plaintiff has failed to present to create a prima
facie case."
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Although Defendant/Appellant preserved the above issues in the Trial Court,
Defendant/Appellant feels that the above issues were ignored and unpreserved by
the Plaintiff/Appellee and/or the ludge. Therefore, Defendant/Appellant requests
the Court of Appeals to review the above non-preserved issues.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

None.

STATEMENT OF T H E CASE

This is a simple case where Plaintiff/Appellee has failed to form a Prima Facie
case and has violated Defendant/Appellant's Rights Pursuant to FDCPA.

STATEMENT OF T H E FACTS

On or around May 30, 2010, Defendant/Appellant received letter from
Plaintiff/Appellee's Attorney, Johnson Mark, Attorneys at Law (hereafter
"Attorney'). Letter, attached as Exhibit iCE'\ was dated May 2~, 2010 and states, in
part, "....Federal law gives you thirty days after vou receive this letter to dispute the
validity of the debt or any part of it

.If you do dispute it. bv notifying our firm in
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writing to that effect, we will, as required by law, obtain and mail YOU proof of the
debt. And if, within the same period, you request in writing the name and address of
vour original creditor, if the original creditor is different from the current creditor, we
will furnish you with that information too... „ Jf, however vou request proof of the
debt or the name and address of the original creditor within the thirtv-dav period that
begins with your receipt of this letter, the law requires our firm to suspend our efforts
to collect the debt (through a lawsuit, arbitration, or otherwise) until we mail the
requested information to vou."

On June 18, 2010 Defendant/Appellant mailed, via certified mail to
Plaintiff/Appellee's Attorney, a letter (submitted as Exhibit C£A" in District Court)
requesting oroof of alleged debt, along with name and address of original creditor. No
response was received bv Defendant/Appellant until, on March 7, 2011, nearly a year
later, a Complaint and summons was served on Defendant/Appellant's father, while
Defendant/Appellant was in Texas visiting family. Defendant/Appellant filed Answer
to Complaint on March 28, 2011.
On Mav 10, 2011, Defendant /Appellant received a letter from
Plaintiff/Appellee's Attornev requesting a Pre-Tnal Conference. Certificate of Mailing
on letter was tvped "On April 21, 2011,1 mailed

" and the 21 was crossed off with

pen and "26" was hand-written above the typed "21". Postmark on the envelope
containing the letter was 05/05/11. Subsequently, Defendant/Appellant received a
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
10 may contain errors.
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letter from the District Court, postmarked 05/11/11, on May 13, 2011. Tins "Notice
of Pre-Tnal Conference" was addressed, incorrectly, to Defendant./Appellant's
phvsical address: 6 7 5 N Lavntzen St # 3 , Hildale, UT 84784. Correct physical address
is: 675 N Lauritzen St.. Hildale UT 84784. U. S. Post Office usually delivers to: P. O.
Box 842272, Hildale UT 84784, yet Defendant/Appellant did, in fact, receive the
"Notice of Pre-Trial Conference" letter from the District Court.
On June 9, 2011, at the Pre-Trial Conference, Defendant/Appellant notified
the District Court judge that no response to Defendant/Appellant's letter had been
received. A representative for Plaintiff/Appellee's attorney stated that "requested
information had been sent but was rejected by U. S. Post Office and returned'/

The following day, on June 10, 2011, Defendant/Appellant mailed, via certified
mail to Plaintiff/Appellee's attorney, a "2 nd Request and Demand....." (submitted as
Exhibit tcB?? in District Court) which requested the information a second time, along
with a "copy of allegedly rejected Postmarked envelope that allegedlv contained
original evidence previousiv requested on June 18, 2010". Subject line of
Defendant/Appellants letter also notified Plaintiff/Appellee's attorney that "This
Demand is Pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act".

On or around July 7, 2011, Defendant/Appellant received Motion for
Summary Judgment, Affidavit of Mycah Struck, Memorandum, Declaration of costs.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR,
11may contain errors.

I

and Exliibit "A", general provisions of [non-specific] cardholder agreement from
Plaintiff /Appellee's attorney. Defendant/Appellant filed Motion in Opposition to
Summary judgment, along with Memorandum and Exhibits "A" through C T)'\

On or around July 21, 2011, Defendant /Appellant received Reply in Support
of Summary Judgment, Request to Submit for Decision, and unsigned Summary
Judgment. On July 21, 2011, Defendant/Appellant filed a Reply in Opposition for
Motion for Summary judgment, Motion to Dismiss, and Order to Dismiss.

On August 2, 2011, the District Judge, signed Plaintiff/Appellee's Summary
Judgment. Defendant/Appellant filed additional motions, including: Motion for
Reconsideration, Motion for Expedited Post-Judgment Hearing, and Notice of
Appeal, among others.

ARGUMENT
1. T H E DISTRICT COURT ERRED I N ITS DECISION WITHOUT
CONSIDERING PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE HAD VIOLATED
D E F E N D A N T / A P P E L L A N T S RIGHTS AND REQUESTS FOR
VERIFICATION OF ALLEGED DEBT PURSUANT TO FDCPA.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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FDCPA was created to protect consumers from unfair debt collection practices of
debt collectors, including attorneys. See HEINTZ et al. v. JENKINS, 514 U.S. 291
(1995). In this case, Plaintiff/Appellee has violated FDCPA after
Defendant/Appellant requested verification of alleged debt. See Fair Debt Collecnon
Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C §§ 1692-1692p. § 809. Validation of debts (a)(4),
and (b). See attached Exhibits "A" through " D ? \ Defendant/Appellant has also
verbally requested verification. Verification was requested by Defendant/Appellant, in
writing, within 30 davs of date on letter from Plaintiff/Appellee's attorney. As of the
date of this Brief, no contract or verification has been presented to
Defendant/Appellant by Plaintiff/Appellee, as evidence, proof, or otherwise.
Defendant/Appellant has. in fact, received numerous mailings pertaining to Motions
with the Court from Plaintiff/Appellee. Therefore, Plaintiff/Appellee has correct
address of Defendant/Appellant, yet Defendant/Appellant has not received
information requested from Plaintiff/Appellee, Pursuant to FDCPA. Wherefore,
Plaintiff/Appellee is in violation of FDCPA and case brought before the District
Court is unlawful and, therefore, harassment. See Eric M. PICHT and Shavleen M.
Picht, Plaintiffs, v. Jon R. HAWKS, George E. Warner and Ton R. Hawks, Ltd.,
Defendants., 77 F.Supp.2d 1041 (1999), "The FDCPA is a remedial strict Ikbilitv
statute which was intended to be applied in a liberal manner.... Proof of deception or
actual damages is not necessarv to make a recoverv under the FDCPA/'
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Machine-generated OCR,
13may contain errors.

2. T H E DISTRICT COURT ERRED I N ITS DECISION AFTER
PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE HAD NEGLECTED TO CEASE
COLLECTION ACTIVITY AFTER DEFENDANT/APPELLANT HAD
REQUESTED NAME A N D ADDRESS OF ORIGINAL CREDITOR
PURSUANT TO FDCPA.

Plaintiff/Appellee has violated FDCPA after Defendant/ Appellant requested
name and address of original creditor. See Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
(FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. f§ 1692-1692p. § 809. Validation of debts (a)(5) and (b). See
attached Exhibits "A" through "D". Defendant/Appellant has also verbally requested
information. Information was recmested, in writing-, within 30 davs of date on letter
1

U-'

from Plaintiff/Appellee's attorney by Defendant/Appellant. See attached Exhibit
"E". As stated in Plaintiff/'Appellee's letter, dated May 27, 2010, 'If, however you
request proof of the debt or the name and address of the original creditor within the
thirtv-dav period that begins with your receipt of tins letter, the law requires our firm
to suspend our efforts to collect the debt (through a lawsuit, arbitration, or otherwise)
until we mail the requested information to you." As of the date of this Brief, name
and address of original creditor, as well as requested "proof have not been presented
to Defendant/Appellant bv Plaintiff/Appellee, as evidence or otherwise, although
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Plaintiff/Appellee filed a lawsuit. Therefore, Plaintiff /Appellee is in violation of
FDCPA.

3. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED I N HOLDING THAT, PURSUANT
TO UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, RULE 56(c),
PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE HAD SUCCEEDED IN «SHOW[ING] THAT
THERE WAS N O GENUINE ISSUE AS TO ANY MATERIAL FACT"
AFTER DEFENDANT/APPELLANT RAISED QUESTIONS
REGARDING PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE'S ALLEGATIONS OF
"BREACH OF CONTRACT", WITHOUT PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE
PRESENTING ALLEGED CONTRACT TO SUPPORT SAID CLAIM.

Defendant/Appellant had, in fact, raised a genuine issue as to material fact in
Defendant/Appellant's MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION IN
OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (page 37 in Trial
Court records), among others, submitted in the District Court. "Defendant has no
involvement with or any affiliation to MCM therefore has no familiaritv in regards bv
which MCM creates and/or maintains its business records. Furthermore. Defendant
has no access to information regarding alleged debt and cannot determine anv validitv
of alleged debt without proper documented evidence of alleged debt as requested.'/
and "Defendant has no access and has not been provided with evidence of alleged

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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debt therefore cannot determine anv alleged balance information or validity of alleged
debt". See Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 56(c).

See John YORGER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PITTSBURGH CORNING
CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee. 733 R2d 1215, "...we cannot accept as an
absolute requirement that a party opposing a motion for summary judgment must file
an affidavit in order to preserve issues adequately mentioned in the response and
elsewhere.

the party moving for summary judgment has the burden to show that

he is entided to judgment under established principles; and if he does not discharge
that burden then he is not entitled to judgment. No defense to an insufficient showing
is required/'

See johnny STILES, Plaintiff v. HOME CABLE CONCEPTS, I N C , et aL,
Defendants. AMERICAN GENERAL FINANCIAL CENTER, Plaintiff; v.
Johnny STILES, Defendant. 994 F.Supp. 1410 (1998), where a contract was
presented, as evidence, to remove "genuine issue of material fact". As of the date of
this Brief, no contract or verification has been presented by Plaintiff/Appellee, as
evidence or otherwise.
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4. T H E DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE HAD PRODUCED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE
ATTACHED TO AFFIDAVIT PURSUANT TO UTAH RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE, RULE 56(e) TO ESTABLISH A PRIMA FACIE CASE.

See Rule 56. Summary judgment, (e) "..... Sworn or certified copies of all papers
or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served
therewith." In this case, Plaintiff/Appellee's only exhibit, exhibit "A'' attached to
Affidavit were some general provisions of a non-specific cardmember agreement.
Nothing in Plaintiff/Appellee's exhibit "A" mentioned Defendant/Appellant.
Plaintiff/Appellee's Affiant, Mycah Struck, stated in Affidavit, ccl have access to and
have reviewed the records pertaining to the account

'\ As such, no "records

pertaining to the account7' were attached thereto or served therewith.

See CELOTEX CORP. v. CATRETX ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE STATE
OF CATRETT, 47" U.S. 317 (1986) "The burden of establishing the nonexistence of
a "genuine issue" is on the part}' moving for summary judgment.. ..This burden has
two distinct components; an initial burden of production, which shifts to the
nonmoving party if satisfied by the moving party; and an ultimate burden of
persuasion, which always remains on the moving party. .. .The court need not deade
whether the moving party has satisfied its ultimate burden of persuasion unless and
until the court finds that the moving party has discharged its initial burden of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR,17
may contain errors.
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production.. .The burden of production imposed bv Rule 56 requires the moving
part}' to make a prima facie showing that it is entitled to summary judgment75.

C O N C L U S I O N / R E L I E F SOUGHT

Defendant/Appellant prays that the Court will forgive Defendant /Appellant's
lack of form, nature, and understanding as Defendant/Appellant is acting Pro Se out
of necessity. Plaintiff/ Appellee has violated and continues to violate
Defendant/Appellant's Rights Pursuant to Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
(FDCPA), 15 U.S.C U 1692-1692p. § 809.. Validation of debts (b).
Defendant/Appellant requests the Court to consider and approach these violations
with regard to Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692p.
| 813. Civil liability.

Further, Plaintiff /Appellee has failed to satisfy the burden of production
Pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56, to make a prima facie shoving
that it is entitled to summary judgment. Defendant/Appellant requests the Court to
reverse summary judgment and dismiss tins case.

In the event the Court is unable to reverse summary judgment and/or dismiss
case, Defendant/Appellant requests the Court to order, or have District Court order
Plaintiff/Appellee to present original signed contract as evidence and proof, provide
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verification of alleged debt and name and address of original creditor, and remand
case, to District Court for trial

>\t*f^
(<

Respectfully submitted tins (T"t

day of December. 2011.

Kenneth Pipkin, Pro Se
P. O. Box 8422^2
Hildale, UT 84"84
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Kenneth Pipkin, hereby certify that on December <^0

2011,1 mailed

copies of Brief of the Appelant to:
JOHNSON MARK LLC
P . O . Box 7811
Sandy, Utah 84091

Kenneth Pipkin
P. O. Bos 8422^2
Hildale, UT 84"84
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TWO

ATTACHMENTS
Exhibit "A'\ Copv of Defendant, Appellant's "1st Request" for proof of [alleged]
debt, name and address of original creditor, dated June 18, 2010.
Exhibit "B*\ Copy of Defendant/Appellant's "'2nd Request and Demand" for proof
of [alleged] debt, name and address of original creditor, dated June 10, 2011.
Exhibits "C" and "D*\ Copies of Certified Receipts for deliverv confirmation of
Exhibits "A" and 4CFV
Exhibit "E'\ Copy of 1st letter from Plaintiff/Appellee's attorney, dated Mav 2 7 ,
2010
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KENNETH PIPKIN

CERTIFIED RFCFIPT # 7009 2250 0003 2205 4542

P.O. Box 842292

1 OF 2 ORIGINAL REQUESTS ( 2 N D ORIGINAL IN POSSESSION OF SENDER)

Hildale, UT 84784

June 18, 2010

JOHNSON MARK LLC ATTORNEYS AT LAW
P.O. Box 7811
Sandy, UT 84091-7811

RE: 1 st Request for ORIGINAL Documentation and ORIGINAL contracts (Reference # 370024)

This letter is in response to the letter sent to KENNETH PIPKIN from JOHNSON MARK LLC
ATTORNEYS AT LAW on May 27, 2010.1 am requesting all ORIGINAL signed contract(s) (NO
copies), ORIGINAL security agreement(s) (NO copies), and all correspondence between
KENNETH PIPKIN and JOHNSON MARK LLC ATTORNEYS AT LAW, MIDLAND FUNDING LLC, HSBC
BANK NEVADA, N.A., and ANY other parties involved (collectively "all parties"). I am also
requesting correspondence (including documentation of verbal correspondence) between "all
parties".
Additionally, I am requesting the name and address of the original creditor, the name and
address of the current creditor and ANY previous, current or future creditor(s), including "all
parties".
! am also requesting the Total Amount Due, as of the date a reply is mailed.
Please mail all documentation, contracts, and correspondence within 30 days from receipt of
this letter. If no reply is sent, we will assume this matter is closed.

tfwwf? ftlfKh
Agent for KENNETH PIPKIN
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EtkV- u 8h
KENNETH PIPKIN
P.O. Box 842272

CERTIFIED RECEIPT#7010
1 OF 2 ORIGINAL REQUESTS (2

ND

tizlQ

000}

0*92

ORIGINAL IN POSSESSION OF SENDER)

Hildale, UT 84784

June 10,2011
JOHNSON MARK LLC ATTORNEYS AT LAW
P.O. Box 7811
Sandy, UT 84091-7811
RE: 2nd Request and Demand for ORIGINAL Documentation and ORIGINAL contracts (Reference
# 370024). This Demand is Pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.
This letter is in response to the letter sent to KENNETH PIPKIN from JOHNSON MARK LLC
ATTORNEYS AT LAW on May 27, 2010. i am demanding all ORIGINAL signed contract(s) (NO
copies), ORIGINAL security agreement(s) (NO copies), and all correspondence between
KENNETH PIPKIN and JOHNSON MARK LLC ATTORNEYS AT LAW, MIDLAND FUNDING LLC, HSBC
BANK NEVADA, N.A., and ANY other parties involved (collectively "ail parties"). I am also
demanding correspondence (including documentation of verbal correspondence) between "al!
parties".
Additionally, I am demanding the name and address of the original creditor, the name and
address of the current creditor and ANY previous, current or future creditor(s), including "all
parties'7.
i am also requesting the alleged Total Amount Due, as of the date a reply is mailed.

Furthermore, as of the date of this letter, 1 am requesting copy of original allegedly rejected
Postmarked envelope that allegedly contained original evidence previously requested on June
18,2010.
Please mail all documentation, contracts, correspondence and copy of allegedly rejected
Postmarked envelope within 30 days from receipt of this letter to requestors address listed
above. If above requested evidence is not received within 30 days, we will assume this matter is
moot.
Requestor cannot answer any Discovery processes until above evidence is produced.

- %~f'T~i rtz.<TK } h 'ihAgent for KENNETH PIPKIN
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify under penalty of perjury that on the 10th day of June 2011,1 mailed a true and
correct copy of Demandanfs 2 nd request and demand to the Plaintiffs address below:
William A. Mark (9602)
JOHNSON MARK LLC ATTORNEYS AT LAW
P.O. Box7811
Sandy, UT 84091-7811
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Kenneth Pipkin
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SENDER: COMPLETE THIS SECTION

COMPLETE THIS SECTION ON DELIVERY

* Complete items 1,2, and 3. Also complete
item 4 if Restricted Delivery is desired.
m Print your name and address on the reverse
so that we can return the card to you.
• Attach this card to the back of the mailpiece,
or on the front if space permits.
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D Addressee

Mr cl

3. Service Type
D Certified Mail
D Registered

D Express Mail
D Return Receipt tor Mercnanaise

D Insured Mail

Q C.O.D.

4. Restricted Delivery? (Extra Fee)

PS Form 3811, February 2004

"TDDT

D Yes
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Domestic Return Receipt

SENDER: COMPLETE THIS SECTION

COMPLETE THIS SECTION ON DELIVERY

m Complete items 1,2, and 3. Also complete
item 4 if Restricted Delivery is desired.
• Print your name and address on the reverse
so that we can return the card to you.
B Attach this card to the back of the mailpiece,
-=or on the front If space permits.

A, Signature^-] f~

1. Article Addressed to:
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D Agent
D Addressee

D. Is delivery address differed from item 1? D Yes
If YES, enter delivery address below:
O No

Mfir^cyi * f L*M
3. Service Type
D Certified Mail
• Registered
D Insured MaH

Q Express Mai!
ED Return Receipt for Merchandise
Q C.O.D.

4. Restricted Delivery? (Extra Fee)
2. Article Number
(Transfer from service label)
PS Form 3 8 1 1 , February 2 0 0 4
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2. Article Number
(Transfer from service label}
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C. Date of Delivery

D. Is deUvery address different irom item 1 ? D Yes
tf YES, enter delivery address below:
D No

1. Article Addressed to:

3*^*1 fts+jc Uc

T*ne ^ Zo(C
D Agent

QYes

7D1D lfc?D DDD5 QD65 bMbfi
Domestic Return Receipt
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ATTORNEYS AT LAW
P.O. Box 7811
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TELEPHONE
1-888-599-6333

L

Sandy, UT 84091-7811
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May 27, 2010

Reference # 370024
Our Client: MIDLAND FUNDING LLC
Original Creditor: HSBC BANK NEVADA, N.A.

KENNETH PIPKIN
PO BOX 842272
HILDALEUT 84784

,. _„

Please remit payment to:
Johnson Mark LLC
P.O. Box 7811
Sandy, UT 84091-7811

_ _ . ...

EleaseJaetumJOapPortion With Payment-

-

—

Our law firm has been retained to collect from you the Total Amount Due below:
Account Number:
Last Charge/Paid Date:
Account Balance:
Attorney/Collection Fee:
Interest Owing:
Total Amount Due:

370024
$
$
$
$

6148.03
0.00
557.53
6705.56

To resolve this matter, you must either pay the Total Amount Due (unless it has already been paid) or call the law
firm at 1-888-599-6333 and work out arrangements for payment If you do neither of these things, our client may be
entitled to file a lawsuit against you or take further action for the collection of this debt.
Federal law gives you thirty days after you receive this letter to dispute the validity of the debt or any part of it If
you do not dispute it within that period, we will assume that it is valid. If you do dispute it by notifying ourfirmin
writing to that effect, we will, as required by law, obtain and mail to you proof of the debt. And if, within the same
period, you request in writing the name and address of your original creditor, if the original creditor is different from
the current creditor, we will furnish you with that information too.
The law does not require our client to wait until the end of the thirty-day period before pursuing their contractual
rights against you to collect this debt If, however, you request proof of the debt or the name and address of the
original creditor within thethirty^day-peric^ tfaatbegins with your receipt of this JetterJtheJawrequires ourfirmto
suspend our efforts to collect the debt (through a lawsuit, arbitration or otherwise) until we mail the requested
information to you.
At this time, no attorney with this firm has personally reviewed the particular circumstances of your account, and no
decision has been made to file a lawsuit However, if you fail to contact this office, our client may consider
additional remedies to recover the Total Amount Due. This is an attempt to collect a debt Any information obtained
will be used for that purpose. This communication is from a debt collector.
As of the date of this letter, you owe the Total Amount Due shown above. Because of interest and/or other charges
(if any, as allowed by law), which may vary from day to day, the Total Amount Due on the day you pay may be
greater than that shown above. For a current Total Amount Due, mail us a request or call 1-888-599-6333.
This law firm reports to a credit-reporting agency. Your failure to pay the Total Amount Due, or provide a dispute,
may result in this account being reported as allowed by law.
We also accept payments by Visa, Mastercard, check-by-phone (ACH), Western Union, and MoneyGram.
To pay online visit www.payjrm.com
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ADDENDUM

CASES:
CELOTEX CORP, v. CATRETT, ADMINISTRATRIX O F T H E ESTATE
O F CATRETT, 477 U.S. 317 (1986)
"Summary judgment is appropriate where the court is satisfied "that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law." Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56(c). The burden of establishing
the nonexistence of a "genuine issue" is on the party moving for summary judgment.
10A C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2727, p. 121
(2d ed. 1983) (hereinafter Wright) (citing cases); 6 J. Moore, W. Taggart & J. Wicker,
Moorefs Federal Practice 1j 56.15[3] (2d ed, 1985) (hereinafter Moore) (citing cases).
See also, ante, at 323; ante, at 328 (WHITE, J., concurring). This burden has two
distinct components: an initial burden of production, which shifts to the nonmoving
party if satisfied by the moving party; and an ultimate burden of persuasion, which
always remains on the moving party. See 10A Wright § 2727. The court need not
decide whether the moving party has satisfied its ultimate burden of persuasion®
unless and until the court finds that the moving party has discharged its initial *331
burden of production. Adickesv. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U. S. 144, 157-161 (1970k
1963 Advisory Committee's Notes on Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56(e), 28 U. S. C. App., p.
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626. The burden of production imposed by Rule 56 requires the moving party to
make a prima facie showing that it is entitled to summary judgment"
Eric M. P I C H T and Shayleen M, Pieht, Plaintiffs, v. Jon R. HAWKS, George
E . Warner and Jon R. Hawks, Ltd., Defendants., 77 F.Supp.2d 1041 (1999)
The FDCPA is a remedial, strict liability statute which was intended to be
applied in a liberal manner. SeeMcGoimn v. Ki/m Inc., 569 F.2d 845, 846 (5th Cir. 1 9 7 8 K
Proof of deception or actual damages is not necessary to make a recovery under the
FDCPA. Bakery. G.C Services Corporation, 6"?7 F.2d 775. 760 f9th Cir.1982); Rirena p.
AL4B Colkctions, Inc.. 682 F.Supp. 174. 175 (W.DJSLY. 19681 Proof of one violation is
sufficient to support a finding of summary judgment in favor of the Plaintiff in an
FDCPA action. Benflev P. Great Lakes Collection Bureau, 6 F,3d 60. 62 (2nd Cir. 1993V
Cacace v. Lucas, 775 F.Supp. 502,. 505 (P.Conn. 1990V Whether the consumer owes the
alleged debt has no bearing on a suit brought pursuant to the FDCPA. McCartney r.
FimtCitv Bank 970 F.2d 45 f5th Cir.1992); Baker v. G.C Services Cort>.. 677 F.2d at 777
i.,r

'-

-" ?

J.

C9th Cir. 1982). Determinations of whether the debt collector's conduct has violated
the FDCPA are made from the perspective of the "least sophisticated consumer."
FTC r. Raladaw Co., 316 U.S. 149. 151-52. 62 S.Ct. 966. 968-69. 86 L.Ed. 1336 (1942V
Exposition Press. Inc. i: FTC. 295 F.2d 869. 873 (2A Cir. 19611 cert, denied, 3^0 U.S. 9 H .
82 S.Ct. 1554. 8 L.Ed.2d 49^ (1962): Jeter p. CreditBurean. Inc.. 760 F.2d 1168. 11721175 filth Cir.19851
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H E I N T Z et aL v. J E N K I N S , 514 U.S. 291 (1995)
There are two rather strong reasons for believing that the Act applies to the
litigating actrvities of lawyers. First, the Act defines the "debt collector [s]ff to whom it
applies as including those who "regularly collec[t] or attemp[t] to collect, directly or
indirectly, [consumer] debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another.11 §
1692a(6). In ordinary English, a lawyer who regularly tries to obtain payment of
consumer debts through legal proceedings is a lawyer who regularly "attempts" to
"collect" those consumer debts. See, e. g., Black's Law Dictionary 263 (6th ed. 1990)
("To collect a debt or claim is to obtain payment or liquidation of it, either by
personal solicitation or legal proceedings").

Johnny STILES, Plaintiff, v. H O M E CABLE C O N C E P T S , INC., et aL

, Defendants. AMERICAN GENERAL FINANCIAL C E N T E R , Plaintiff, v.
Johnny STILES, Defendant. 994 F.Supp. 1410 (1998)

"The party asking for summary judgment "always bears the initial responsibility
of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those
portions of the 'pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
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file, together with the affidavits, if any/ which it believes demonstrate the absence of a
genuine issue of material fact" Id. at 323.

*

If the movant succeeds in demonstrating the absence of a material issue of fact, the
burden shifts to the non-movant to establish, with evidence beyond the pleadings,
that a genuine issue material to the non-movantfs case exists."
t

"In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the evidence presented by the
nonmovant must be believed and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in his favor.
Anderson* 477 U.S. at 255. The facts, as viewed in that light, are as follows.

This is a satellite case. Plaintiff Johnny Stiles purchased a satellite television receiving
system on or about January 31, 1994. To finance this purchase, Mr. Stiles appHed for a
revolving charge account with AGFC. See Credit Application, 3-31-94, On the
application, there are four caveats printed in bold directly above the signature line.
One of these states that

BY SIGNING BELOW YOU: .. .

(3) Agree that if this application is accepted and credit is extended by American
General Financial Center, you will be bound by the terms of the Cardholder
Agreement attached hereto, a copy of which has been provided to you.
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Id Mr. Stiles signed and dated the application below this statement, thereby binding
himself to the cardholder agreement. Id

The Cardholder Agreement establishes a number of duties for A G F Q as well as the
credit card holder/*
John YORGER, Plaintiff-AppeHant, v. PITTSBURGH CORNING
CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee. 733 R2d 1215

".. .we cannot accept as an absolute requirement that a party opposing a
motion for summary judgment must file an affidavit in order to preserve issues
adequately mentioned in the response and elsewhere. Moreover, defendant's argument
ignores the fundamental rule that the burdens of establishing the absence of a genuine
issue of material fact and the entitlement to judgment as a matter of law are on the
movant. The nonmovant may not, of course, "rest upon the mere allegations or
denials of his pleadings/1 Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), but rather must respond. Including an
affidavit along with the response, however, is not an absolute requirement to oppose a
summary judgment motion, particularly where summary judgment is improper. The
Supreme Court decided this issue in Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.? 398 U.S. 144, 90
S.Ct 1598, 26 L.£d.2d 142, wherein it held that f,[w]here the evidentiary matter in
support of the motion [for summary judgment] does not establish the absence of a
genuine issue, summary judgment must be denied even if no opposing evidentiarv
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matter is presented/ 1 398 U.S. at 160, 90 S.Ct. at 1609-1610 (footnote omitted,
emphasis in original) (quoting Advisory Committee Note on 1963 Amendment to
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)). The Court further observed that: It has always been perilous for
the opposing party neither to proffer any countering evidentiary materials nor file a
56(f) affidavit. And the peril rightly continues [after the amendment to Rule 56(e) ].
Yet the party moving for summary judgment has the burden to show that he is
entitled to judgment under established principles; and if he does not discharge that
burden then he is not entided to judgment. No defense to an insufficient showing is
required. 6 j . Moore, Federal Practice p 56.22, pp. 2824-2825 (2d ed. 1966) [amended
1982]."

RULES:

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56(c), Summary Judgment. Motion
and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall be in
accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought shall he rendered if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entided to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment,
intedocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although
there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
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Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56(e), Summary Judgment. Form of
affidavits; further testimony; defense required, Supporting and opposing affidavits
shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible
in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the
matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof
referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The
court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers
to interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is
made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the
mere allegations or denials of the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as
otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial Summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against a
party faiEng to file such a response.

OTHER AUTHORITIES:

Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692p.
§ 809. Validation of debts.

(a)

Within five days after the initial communication with a consumer in
connection with the collection of any debt a debt collector shall,
unless the following information is contained in the initial
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communication or the consumer has paid the debt, send the
consumer a written notice containing—

(4) a statement that if the consumer notifies the debt collector in
writing within the thirty-day period that the debt, or any portion
thereof, is disputed, the debt collector will obtain verification of the
debt or a copy of a judgment against the consumer and a copy of
such verification or judgment will be mailed to the consumer hv the
debt collector; and

(5) a statement that, upon the consumer's written request within the
thirty-day period, the debt collector will provide the consumer with
the name and address of the original creditor, if different from the
current creditor.

If the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing within the thirtyday period described in subsection (a) that the debt, or any portion
thereof, is disputed, or that the consumer requests the name and address
of the original creditor, the debt collector shall cease collection of the
debt, or any disputed portion thereof, until the debt collector obtains
verification of the debt or anv copy of a judgment, or the name and
address of the original creditor, and a copy of such verification or
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judgment, or name and address of the original creditor, is mailed to the
consumer by the debt collector. Collection activities and
communications that do not otherwise violate this title may continue
during the 30-day period referred to m subsection (a) unless the
consumer has notified the debt collector in writing that the debt, or any
portion of the debt, is disputed or that the consumer requests the name
and address of die original creditor. Any collection activities and
communication during the 30-day period may not overshadow or be
inconsistent with the disclosure of the consumer's right to dispute the
debt or request the name and address of the original creditor.
Fair Debt CoUection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692p.
| 813. Civil liability.
(a) Except as otherwise provided by this section, any debt collector who fails to
comply with any provision of this title with respect to any person is liable to such
person in an amount equal to the sum of—

(1) any actual damage sustained by such person as a result of such failure;
(2) (A) in the case of any action by an individual, such additional damages as
the court may allow, but not exceeding $1,000; or
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(B) in the case of a class action,
(i) such amount for each named plaintiff as could be recovered
under subparagraph (A), and
(ii) such amount as the court may allow for all other class
members, without regard to a minimum individual recovery, not to
exceed the lesser of $500,000 or 1 per centum of the net worth of the
debt collector; and
(3) in the case of any successful action to enforce the foregoing liability, the
costs of the action, together with a reasonable attorney's fee as determined by
the court. On a finding by the court that an action under this section was
brought in bad faith and for the purpose of harassment, the court may award to
the defendant attorney's fees reasonable in relation to the work expended and
costs.
(b) In determining the amount of liability in any action under subsection (a), the court
shall consider, among other relevant factors—
(1) in any individual action under subsection (a)(2)(A), the frequency and
persistence of noncompliance by the debt collector, the nature of such
noncompliance, and the extent to which such noncompliance was intentional;
or
(2) in any class action under subsection (a)(2)(B), the frequency and persistence
of noncompliance by the debt collector, the nature of such noncompliance, the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
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resources of the debt collector, the number of persons adversely affected, and
the extent to which the debt collector's noncompliance was intentional.
(c) A debt collector may not be held liable in any action brought under this tide if the
debt collector shows by a preponderance of evidence that the violation was not intentional and resulted from a bona fide error notwithstanding the maintenance of
procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such error.
(d) An action to enforce any liability created by this tide may be brought in any
appropriate United States district court without regard to the amount in controversy,
or in any other court of competent jurisdiction, within one year from die date on
which the violation occurs.

(e) No provision of this section imposing any liability shall apply to any act done or
omitted in good faith in conformity widi any advisory opinion of the Commission,
notwithstanding that after such act or omission has occurred, such opinion is
amended, rescinded, or determined by judicial or other audiority to be invalid for any
reason.
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